In this short paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. Both versions are extremely transparent. The first version assumes a two-agent society; the second version, which is similar to a theorem of Pollak, assumes two or more agents. Both of our theorems rely on diversity of preferences axioms, and we explore alternative notions of diversity at length. Our first theorem also uses a neutrality assumption, commonly used in the literature; our second theorem uses a neutrality/monotonicity assumption, which is stronger and less commonly used. We provide examples to show the logical independence of the axioms, and to illustrate our points.
Introduction.
In 1950 Kenneth Arrow (1950 Arrow ( , 1963 ) provided a striking answer to a basic abstract problem of democracy: how can the preferences of many individuals be aggregated into social preferences? The answer, which has come to be known as Arrow's impossibility theorem, was that every conceivable aggregation method has some flaw. That is, a handful of reasonable-looking axioms, which one hopes an aggregation procedure would satisfy, lead to impossibility: the axioms are mutually inconsistent. In this paper we shall develop two versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem.
Our models are so-called single-profile models. This means impossibility is established in the context of one fixed profile of preferences, rather than in the (standard) Arrow context of many varying preference profiles. Single-profile Arrow theorems were first proved in the late 1970's by Parks (1976) , Hammond (1976) , Kemp and Ng (1976) , Pollak (1979) , and Roberts (1980) . Rubinstein (1984) used mathematical logic to see whether or not there are single-profile versions of every multi-profile theorem of social choice.
Single-profile theorems were devised in response to an argument of Paul Samuelson (1967) (Bergson (1938) ), which depends on a given set of ordinal utility functions, that is, a fixed preference profile. The single-profile Arrow theorems established that bad results (dictatorship, or illogic of social preferences, or, more generally, impossibility of aggregation) could be proved with one fixed preference profile (or set of ordinal utility functions), provided the profile is "diverse" enough. This paper has two purposes. The first is to provide two short and transparent single-profile Arrow theorems. In addition to being short and simple, our theorems, unlike previous single-profile Arrow theorems, do not require the existence of large numbers of alternatives. Our second purpose is to explore the meaning of preference profile diversity. Our first Arrow impossibility theorem assumes that there are only two people, and is extremely easy to prove. The proof relies on a neutrality assumption and our first version of preference diversity, which we call diversity-1. We argue that, in single-profile models, neutrality is the natural assumption to substitute for Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. In our second version of Arrow's impossibility theorem, which is close to Pollak's, there are two or more people. We strengthen neutrality to neutrality/monotonicity, as was done by Pollak and others. We use a much weaker preference diversity assumption, diversity-2, than was used by other authors. This is the main innovation of our second theorem. Although the diversity-2 assumption has the drawback that it requires some information about the social preference relation in order to be well defined, it has the great advantage is that it is "almost necessary" for the impossibility result. In fact we offer a near-converse to the impossibility result: if there is a dictator, the preference profile must satisfy diversity-2.
2 working papers series Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) argue for returning to the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function framework, and in the process are critical of neutrality. While we concede that the neutrality condition may sometimes be problematic, we feel it is more often reasonable, and we argue for its appropriateness below. We also point out that the existence of Arrow-type dictators may be less objectionable in a single-profile world than in multi-profile worlds, although if preferences are diverse enough dictators remain undesirable. We discuss alternative preference diversity assumptions at length, and we clarify the relationship between diversity and dictatorship for single-profile Arrow theorems.
Other recent related literature includes Geanakoplos (2005) , who has three very elegant proofs of Arrow's theorem in the standard multi-profile context, and Ubeda (2004) who has another elegant multi-profile proof. These proofs, while short, are mathematically more challenging than ours. Ubeda also emphasizes the importance of (multi-profile) neutrality, similar to but stronger than the assumption we use in this paper, and much stronger than Arrow's independence, and he provides several theorems establishing neutrality's equivalence to other intuitively appealing principles. Reny (2001) has an interesting side-by-side pair of (multi-profile) proofs, of Arrow's theorem and the related theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite.
The Model.
We assume a society with individuals, and 3 or more alternatives. society prefers x to y or is indifferent between them; xPy means society prefers x to y; xIy means society is indifferent between them. We will start with the following assumptions:
(1) Complete and transitive social preferences. The social preference relation R is complete and transitive. , he is by definition a dictator. We will discuss this possibility of innocuous dictatorship in section 9 below. For now, we simply observe that if preferences between individuals are diverse enough, and indifference is limited enough, dictatorship remains extremely objectionable, even in a single-profile world.
Some Examples in a 2-Person Model.
We will illustrate with a few simple examples. For these there are 2 people and 3 alternatives, and we assume no individual indifference between any pair of alternatives. In short, in a single-profile model, independence is a vacuous assumption, and its natural substitute is neutrality. 
Consider the following graph:
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Utility levels of individuals 1 and 2 are on the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. Each alternative shows up in the graph as a utility pair, for instance represents alternative . We start at and draw horizontal and vertical lines through it, creating 4 quadrants. We make two observations about the Fleurbaey/Mongin graphical impossibility argument. First, it has the significant disadvantage that it requires the use of the utility functions and , and it is cleaner to dispense with utility functions and simply use preference relations for individuals. Second, it incorporates a crucial diversity assumption without being explicit about it. Assuming the existence of the triple of utility vectors , , and , with their respective locations in the utility diagram, is in fact exactly the assumption of diverse-1 preferences: both 1 and 2 prefer x to y, but opinions are split on x vs. z and opinions are split on y vs. z. In our Arrow impossibility theorem 1 below we make this assumption explicit.
5. Arrow Impossibility Theorem 1, n = 2.
We are ready to turn to our own simple version of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in the single-profile model. Throughout this section, we assume n = 2. We will show 12 working papers series that our 5 assumptions, complete and transitive social preferences, strong Pareto, neutrality, diverse-1 preferences, and no dictator, are mutually inconsistent. In our theorem we are using strong Pareto and neutrality to get impossibility. With an almost identical proof we could substitute weak Pareto and neutrality/monotonicity, where neutrality/monotonicity is a strengthened version of neutrality, to be discussed below.
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person who prefers x to z is a dictator, by proposition 1. If zPx, then the person who prefers z to x is a dictator, by proposition 1.
Suppose then that xIz. Then zIx. By transitivity, zIx and xPy implies zPy.
But opinions are split on y vs. z. Therefore one person prefers z to y, and the other person prefers y to z. By proposition 1, the person who prefers z to y is a dictator.
We have shown that whatever the social preference for x and z might be, there must be a dictator. QED.
Trying to Generalize to an n-Person Model.
In what follows we will seek to generalize our version of Arrow's theorem to societies with arbitrary numbers of people. From this point on in the paper we will assume . In order to get an impossibility theorem when , we will need to strengthen some of our basic assumptions. We start with the neutrality assumption. We will strengthen it to a single-profile version of what is called neutrality/monotonicity.
(See Blau & Deb (1977) , who call the multi-profile analog "full neutrality and monotonicity"; Sen (1977) , who calls it NIM; and Pollak (1979), who calls it "nonnegative responsiveness.") 2 ≥ n 2 ≥ n (3.b) Neutrality/monotonicity. Suppose the support for w over z is as strong or stronger than the support for x over y, and suppose the opposite support, for z over w, is as weak or weaker than the support for y over x. Then, if the social preference is for x over y, the social preference must also be for w over z. 
Diversity.
In this section we will modify the diverse preferences assumption.
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Before doing so, let's revisit the assumption in the n = 2 world. In that world, diverse-1 preferences says there must exist a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xP i y for i = 1, 2, but such that opinions are split on x vs. z and on y vs. z. That is, one person prefers x to z, while the other prefers z to x, and one person prefers y to z, while the other prefers z to y. Given our assumption that individual preferences are transitive, it must be the case that the two people's preferences over the triple can be represented as follows:
Diverse-1 preferences array, n = 2.
Person i
Person We believe Pollak diversity is much stronger than necessary, and we will proceed as follows. We will not assume the existence of a triple x, y and z to give every conceivable array of preferences on that triple. We will not even assume a triple x, y and z to give every possible array for given V, V 1 , V 2 , and V C , as per the description of the standard Arrow array. We will only assume the existence of the required Arrow-type triple, and we will only assume that much when the Arrow array matters. For the purposes of our proof, the Arrow array assumption only matters if V is a decisive set of minimal size, and if it has 2 or more members.
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We say that a set of people V is decisive if it is non-empty and if, for all alternatives x and y, if xP i y for all i in V, then xPy. V is a minimally sized decisive set if there is no decisive set of smaller cardinality.
It is appropriate to make a few comments about the notion of decisiveness. First, note that if person i is a dictator, then i by himself is a minimally sized decisive set, although without 2 or more members, and any set strictly containing i is also decisive, but not minimally sized. Also, note that the Pareto principle (weak or strong) implies the set of all people is decisive. Second, in a multi-preference profile world, decisiveness for V would be a far stronger assumption that it is in the single-profile world, since it would require that (the same) V prevail no matter how preferences might change. We only require that V prevail under the given fixed preference profile.
Our diversity assumption is now modified as follows: Nonetheless, it is a logical definition. An important advantage of this definition is that is just strong enough to get the desired impossibility result.
Referring back to example 6 of the previous section, consider persons 2 and 3.
Under simple majority rule, which was assumed in the example, they constitute a decisive coalition. They are a coalition of 2 or more members. They are a minimallysized decisive coalition, because there is no dictator. However the diverse-2 preferences assumption fails in that example, because there is no way to define the triple x, y, z so as to get the standard Arrow array, when V 1 = {2}, V 2 = {3}, and V C = {1}. Therefore diverse-2 preferences rules out example 6. We now proceed to a proof of our second single-profile Arrow's theorem, which, unlike our first proof, is not restricted to a 2-person society.
2 Although Pollak made a much stronger diversity assumption than we use, and although Parks (1976), Hammond 2 We have a similar proof for a multi-profile Arrow's theorem in Feldman & Serrano (2006 Therefore decisive sets exist. Let V be a decisive set of minimal size, that is, a decisive set with no proper subsets that are also decisive. We will show that there is only one person in V, which will make that person a dictator. This will establish Arrow's theorem.
Suppose to the contrary that V has 2 or more members. By the diverse-2 preferences assumption there is a triple of alternatives x, y, and z, and a partition of V into non-empty subsets V 1 Therefore we need to make a few comments about why dictatorship should worry us, even though some dictators are innocuous. First, while we assume a single-profile world in this paper, and while for certain given profiles dictatorship doesn't look bad, we must remember that there can be other single-profile worlds with different given preference profiles. So, while in some cases an innocuous dictatorship is acceptable, in many other cases it is very much unacceptable. Second, we could easily get rid of the This definition of diversity is exactly the same as diverse-2 preferences, except the decisive set V is no longer required to be minimally sized. Obviously diverse-3 preferences is stronger than diverse-2 preferences, but still nowhere near as strong as Pollak diversity; nor does it require near as many distinct alternatives as Pollak diversity.
Since diverse-3 preferences implies diverse-2 preferences, proposition 2 and theorem 2 go through with diverse-3 preferences. Our near-converse to theorem 2 of course would no longer hold. 
